Secure session management for browser-based screen sharing support tool

I’m designing a web-based screen sharing tool for customer support, where support agents need to view customers’ screens without requiring any software installation.
The flow I’m considering is:

Support agent generates/receives a session … Continue reading Secure session management for browser-based screen sharing support tool

How can I use PBKDF2 to derive an encryption key from a password and then access that key later without the password (i.e. with a cookie)?

I’m developing a notetaking app that will store users’ note and file data encrypted in a db and on backblaze (respectively). The app will not be end-to-end encrypted but data will be encrypted in transit (with TLS) and at rest (AES256, for… Continue reading How can I use PBKDF2 to derive an encryption key from a password and then access that key later without the password (i.e. with a cookie)?

Do browsers like FireFox, Chrome, Opera, and Tor store TLS 1.3 session tickets on the disk?

Do browsers save TLS 1.3 session tickets on the disk to resume a TLS session after the browser process has been killed and restarted?
Are there any glaring security risks of caching TLS 1.3 session tickets on the client side? I believe th… Continue reading Do browsers like FireFox, Chrome, Opera, and Tor store TLS 1.3 session tickets on the disk?

Besides checking whether the session ID is valid, what other things should we check in order to prevent session ID leakage? [duplicate]

If the SessionID is leaked/hacked by someone else and they use that SessionID to get access to the account, can we double-check whether the SessionID is used on the right device? I’m thinking of checking the device fingerprint and whether … Continue reading Besides checking whether the session ID is valid, what other things should we check in order to prevent session ID leakage? [duplicate]