Android: Can you exploit a broadcast Receiver that receives a custom object from the intent?

The app I am trying to attack (under a legitimate bug bounty program of course) has the following code for its broadcast receiver:

//From vulnerable app
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramIntent)
{
…… Continue reading Android: Can you exploit a broadcast Receiver that receives a custom object from the intent?

How possible would it be for an attacker to sniff the pairing process in Classic Bluetooth?

Classic Bluetooth protects its connection by keeping the pairing process secret. How does Classic Bluetooth prevent the keys from being sniffed during the pairing process? On what channel does the pairing process occur?

Continue reading How possible would it be for an attacker to sniff the pairing process in Classic Bluetooth?

Is Ubertooth able to sniff traffic for more than one device for both classic bluetooth and BLE?

With tools like kismet,ubertooth-follow and ubertooth-btle, is it possible to sniff all bluetooth traffic for all devices at any given point in time? From what I understand, it is not possible since you need to follow the hop… Continue reading Is Ubertooth able to sniff traffic for more than one device for both classic bluetooth and BLE?

Which attributes of a WPA AP certificate are used by a client device in deciding if the certificate has been trusted before?

When connecting to a new AP, the client device will pop a warning to ask if the certificate of the new AP should be trusted. If trusted, the warning doesn’t show anymore if the certificate is known to have been trusted before… Continue reading Which attributes of a WPA AP certificate are used by a client device in deciding if the certificate has been trusted before?