Collaborate Disseminate
I recently stumbled across an NSA Cyber Advisory titled Managing Risk from Transport Layer Security Inspection (U/OO/212028-19) after first learning about it through Jonas Lejon’s blog post NSA varnar för TLS-inspektion (Swedish). I read the NSA r… Continue reading The NSA HSTS Security Feature Mystery
The free and open source network forensics tool NetworkMiner now comes with improved extraction of files and metadata from several protocols as well as a few GUI updates. But the biggest improvements for version 2.3 are in the commercial tool NetworkMi… Continue reading NetworkMiner 2.3 Released!
Dripcap is a modern, graphical packet analyzer based on Electron. Electron, you say? “Electron is a framework for creating native applications with web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. It takes care of the hard parts so you can focus on the… Continue reading Toolsmith #124: Dripcap – Caffeinated Packet Analyzer
PCAPs or it didn’t happen, right?
Introduction
Packet heads, this toolsmith is for you. Social media to the rescue. Packet Watcher (jinq102030) Tweeted using the #toolsmith hashtag to say that WireEdit would make a great toolsmith topic. Right you are, sir! Thank you. Many consider Wireshark the eponymous tool for packet analysis; it was only my second toolsmith topic almost ten years ago in November 2006. I wouldn’t dream of conducting network forensic analysis without NetworkMiner (August 2008) or CapLoader (October 2015). Then there’s Xplico, Security Onion, NST, Hex, the list goes on and on…
Time to add a new one. Ever want to more easily edit those packets? Me too. Enter WireEdit, a comparatively new player in the space. Michael Sukhar (@wirefloss) wrote and maintains WireEdit, the first universal WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) packet editor. Michael identifies WireEdit as a huge productivity booster for anybody working with network packets, in a manner similar to other industry groundbreaking WYSIWIG tools.
In Michael’s own words: “Network packets are complex data structures built and manipulated by applying complex but, in most cases, well known rules. Manipulating packets with C/C++, or even Python, requires programming skills not everyone possesses and often lots of time, even if one has to change a single bit value. The other existing packet editors support editing of low stack layers like IPv4, TCP/UDP, etc, because the offsets of specific fields from the beginning of the packet are either fixed or easily calculated. The application stack layers supported by those pre-WireEdit tools are usually the text based ones, like SIP, HTTP, etc. This is because no magic is required to edit text. WireEdit’s main innovation is that it allows editing binary encoded application layers in a WYSIWYG mode.“
I’ve typically needed to edit packets to anonymize or reduce captures, but why else would one want to edit packets?
1) Sanitization: Often, PCAPs contain sensitive data. To date, there has been no easy mechanism to “sanitize” a PCAP, which, in turn, makes traces hard to share.
2) Security testing: Engineers often want to vary or manipulate packets to see how the network stack reacts to it. To date, that task is often accomplished via programmatic means.
WireEdit allows you to do so in just a few clicks.
Michael describes a demo video he published in April 2015, where he edits the application layer of the SS7 stack (GSM MAP packets). GSM MAP is the protocol responsible for much of the application logic in “classic” mobile networks, and is still widely deployed. The packet he edits carries an SMS text message, and the layer he edits is way up the stack and binary encoded. Michael describes the message displayed as a text, but notes that if looking at the binary of the packet, you wouldn’t find it there due to complex encoding. If you choose to decode in order to edit the text, your only option is to look up the offset of the appropriate bytes in Wireshark or a similar tool, and try to edit the bytes directly.
This often completely breaks the packet and Michael proudly points out that he’s not aware of any tool allowing to such editing in WYSIWYG mode. Nor am I, and I enjoyed putting WireEdit through a quick validation of my own.
Test Plan
I conceived a test plan to modify a PCAP of normal web browsing traffic with web application attacks written in to the capture with WireEdit. Before editing the capture, I’d run it through a test harness to validate that no rules were triggered resulting in any alerts, thus indicating that the capture was clean. The test harness was a Snort 2.9.8.0 instance I’d implemented on a new Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, configured with Snort VRT and Emerging Threats emerging-web_server and emerging-web_specific_apps rules enabled. To keep our analysis all in the family I took a capture while properly browsing the OpenBSD entry for tcpdump.
A known good request for such a query would, in text, as a URL, look like:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8
Conversely, if I were to pass a cross-site scripting attack (I did not, you do not) via this same URL and one of the available parameters, in text, it might look something like:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8%22onmouseover%3Dalert(1337)%2F%2F
Again though, my test plan was one where I wasn’t conducting any actual attacks against any website, and instead used WireEdit to “maliciously” modify the packet capture from a normal browsing session. I would then parsed it with Snort to validate that the related web application security rules fired correctly.
This in turn would validate WireEdit’s capabilities as a WYSIWYG PCAP editor as you’ll see in the walk-though. Such a testing scenario is a very real method for testing the efficacy of your IDS for web application attack detection, assuming it utilized a Snort-based rule set.
Testing
On my Ubuntu Snort server VM I ran sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w toolsmith.pcap while browsing http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8.
Next, I ran sudo snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -r toolsmith.pcap against the clean, unmodified PCAP to validate that no alerts were received, results noted in Figure 1.
 |
| Figure 1: No alerts triggered via initial OpenBSD browsing PCAP |
I then dragged the capture (407 packets) over to my Windows host running WireEdit.
Now wait for it, because this is a lot to grasp in short period of time regarding using WireEdit.
In the WireEdit UI, click the Open icon, then select the PCAP you wish to edit, and…that’s it, you’re ready to edit. 🙂 WireEdit tagged packet #9 with the pre-requisite GET request marker I was interest in so expanded that packet, and drilled down to the HTTP: GET descriptor and the Request-URI under Request-Line. More massive complexity, here take notes because it’s gonna be rough. I right-clicked the Request-URI, selected Edit PDU, and edited the PDU with a cross-site scripting (JavaScript) payload (URL encoded) as part of the GET request. I told you, really difficult right? Figure 2 shows just how easy it really is.
 |
| Figure 2: Using WireEdit to modify Request-URI with XSS payload |
I then saved the edited PCAP as toolsmithXSS.pcap and dragged it back over to my Snort server and re-ran it through Snort. The once clean, pristine PCAP elicited an entirely different response from Snort this time. Figure 3 tells no lies.
 |
| Figure 3: XSS ET Snort alert fires |
Perfect, in what was literally a :30 second edit with WireEdit, I validated that my ten minute Snort setup catches cross-site scripting attempts with at least one rule. And no websites were actually harmed in the making of this test scenario, just a quick tweak with WireEdit.
That was fun, let’s do it again, this time with a SQL injection payload. Continuing with toolsmithXSS.pcap I jumped to the GET request in frame 203 as it included a request for a different query and again edited the Request-URI with an attack specific for MySQL as seen in Figure 4.
I saved this PCAP modification as toolsmithXSS_SQLi.pcap and returned to the Snort server for yet another happy trip Snort Rule Lane. As Figure 5 represents, we had an even better result this time.
 |
| Figure 5: WireEdited PCAP trigger multiple SQL injection alerts |
In addition to the initial XSS alert firing again, this time we collected four alerts for:
That’s a big fat “hell, yes” for WireEdit.
Still with me that I never actually executed these attacks? I just edited the PCAP with WireEdit and fed it back to the Snort beast. Imagine a PCAP like being optimized for the OWASP Top 10 and being added to your security test library, and you didn’t need to conduct any actual web application attacks. Thanks WireEdit!
Conclusion
WireEdit is beautifully documented, with a great Quickstart. Peruse the WireEdit website and FAQ, and watch the available videos. The next time you need to edit packets, you’ll be well armed and ready to do so with WireEdit, and you won’t be pulling your hair out trying to accomplish it quickly, effectively, and correctly. WireEdit my a huge leap from not known to me to the top five on my favorite tools list. WireEdit is everything it is claimed to be. Outstanding.
Ping me via email or Twitter if you have questions: russ at holisticinfosec dot org or @holisticinfosec.
ACK
Thanks to Michael Sukhar for WireEdit and Packet Watcher for the great suggestion. Continue reading toolsmith #114: WireEdit and Deep Packet Modification
PCAPs or it didn’t happen, right?
Introduction
Packet heads, this toolsmith is for you. Social media to the rescue. Packet Watcher (jinq102030) Tweeted using the #toolsmith hashtag to say that WireEdit would make a great toolsmith topic. Right you are, sir! Thank you. Many consider Wireshark the eponymous tool for packet analysis; it was only my second toolsmith topic almost ten years ago in November 2006. I wouldn’t dream of conducting network forensic analysis without NetworkMiner (August 2008) or CapLoader (October 2015). Then there’s Xplico, Security Onion, NST, Hex, the list goes on and on…
Time to add a new one. Ever want to more easily edit those packets? Me too. Enter WireEdit, a comparatively new player in the space. Michael Sukhar (@wirefloss) wrote and maintains WireEdit, the first universal WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) packet editor. Michael identifies WireEdit as a huge productivity booster for anybody working with network packets, in a manner similar to other industry groundbreaking WYSIWIG tools.
In Michael’s own words: “Network packets are complex data structures built and manipulated by applying complex but, in most cases, well known rules. Manipulating packets with C/C++, or even Python, requires programming skills not everyone possesses and often lots of time, even if one has to change a single bit value. The other existing packet editors support editing of low stack layers like IPv4, TCP/UDP, etc, because the offsets of specific fields from the beginning of the packet are either fixed or easily calculated. The application stack layers supported by those pre-WireEdit tools are usually the text based ones, like SIP, HTTP, etc. This is because no magic is required to edit text. WireEdit’s main innovation is that it allows editing binary encoded application layers in a WYSIWYG mode.“
I’ve typically needed to edit packets to anonymize or reduce captures, but why else would one want to edit packets?
1) Sanitization: Often, PCAPs contain sensitive data. To date, there has been no easy mechanism to “sanitize” a PCAP, which, in turn, makes traces hard to share.
2) Security testing: Engineers often want to vary or manipulate packets to see how the network stack reacts to it. To date, that task is often accomplished via programmatic means.
WireEdit allows you to do so in just a few clicks.
Michael describes a demo video he published in April 2015, where he edits the application layer of the SS7 stack (GSM MAP packets). GSM MAP is the protocol responsible for much of the application logic in “classic” mobile networks, and is still widely deployed. The packet he edits carries an SMS text message, and the layer he edits is way up the stack and binary encoded. Michael describes the message displayed as a text, but notes that if looking at the binary of the packet, you wouldn’t find it there due to complex encoding. If you choose to decode in order to edit the text, your only option is to look up the offset of the appropriate bytes in Wireshark or a similar tool, and try to edit the bytes directly.
This often completely breaks the packet and Michael proudly points out that he’s not aware of any tool allowing to such editing in WYSIWYG mode. Nor am I, and I enjoyed putting WireEdit through a quick validation of my own.
Test Plan
I conceived a test plan to modify a PCAP of normal web browsing traffic with web application attacks written in to the capture with WireEdit. Before editing the capture, I’d run it through a test harness to validate that no rules were triggered resulting in any alerts, thus indicating that the capture was clean. The test harness was a Snort 2.9.8.0 instance I’d implemented on a new Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, configured with Snort VRT and Emerging Threats emerging-web_server and emerging-web_specific_apps rules enabled. To keep our analysis all in the family I took a capture while properly browsing the OpenBSD entry for tcpdump.
A known good request for such a query would, in text, as a URL, look like:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8
Conversely, if I were to pass a cross-site scripting attack (I did not, you do not) via this same URL and one of the available parameters, in text, it might look something like:
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8%22onmouseover%3Dalert(1337)%2F%2F
Again though, my test plan was one where I wasn’t conducting any actual attacks against any website, and instead used WireEdit to “maliciously” modify the packet capture from a normal browsing session. I would then parsed it with Snort to validate that the related web application security rules fired correctly.
This in turn would validate WireEdit’s capabilities as a WYSIWYG PCAP editor as you’ll see in the walk-though. Such a testing scenario is a very real method for testing the efficacy of your IDS for web application attack detection, assuming it utilized a Snort-based rule set.
Testing
On my Ubuntu Snort server VM I ran sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w toolsmith.pcap while browsing http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man8/tcpdump.8?query=tcpdump&sec=8.
Next, I ran sudo snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -r toolsmith.pcap against the clean, unmodified PCAP to validate that no alerts were received, results noted in Figure 1.
|
| Figure 1: No alerts triggered via initial OpenBSD browsing PCAP |
I then dragged the capture (407 packets) over to my Windows host running WireEdit.
Now wait for it, because this is a lot to grasp in short period of time regarding using WireEdit.
In the WireEdit UI, click the Open icon, then select the PCAP you wish to edit, and…that’s it, you’re ready to edit. 🙂 WireEdit tagged packet #9 with the pre-requisite GET request marker I was interest in so expanded that packet, and drilled down to the HTTP: GET descriptor and the Request-URI under Request-Line. More massive complexity, here take notes because it’s gonna be rough. I right-clicked the Request-URI, selected Edit PDU, and edited the PDU with a cross-site scripting (JavaScript) payload (URL encoded) as part of the GET request. I told you, really difficult right? Figure 2 shows just how easy it really is.
|
| Figure 2: Using WireEdit to modify Request-URI with XSS payload |
I then saved the edited PCAP as toolsmithXSS.pcap and dragged it back over to my Snort server and re-ran it through Snort. The once clean, pristine PCAP elicited an entirely different response from Snort this time. Figure 3 tells no lies.
|
| Figure 3: XSS ET Snort alert fires |
Perfect, in what was literally a :30 second edit with WireEdit, I validated that my ten minute Snort setup catches cross-site scripting attempts with at least one rule. And no websites were actually harmed in the making of this test scenario, just a quick tweak with WireEdit.
That was fun, let’s do it again, this time with a SQL injection payload. Continuing with toolsmithXSS.pcap I jumped to the GET request in frame 203 as it included a request for a different query and again edited the Request-URI with an attack specific for MySQL as seen in Figure 4.
I saved this PCAP modification as toolsmithXSS_SQLi.pcap and returned to the Snort server for yet another happy trip Snort Rule Lane. As Figure 5 represents, we had an even better result this time.
|
| Figure 5: WireEdited PCAP trigger multiple SQL injection alerts |
In addition to the initial XSS alert firing again, this time we collected four alerts for:
That’s a big fat “hell, yes” for WireEdit.
Still with me that I never actually executed these attacks? I just edited the PCAP with WireEdit and fed it back to the Snort beast. Imagine a PCAP like being optimized for the OWASP Top 10 and being added to your security test library, and you didn’t need to conduct any actual web application attacks. Thanks WireEdit!
Conclusion
WireEdit is beautifully documented, with a great Quickstart. Peruse the WireEdit website and FAQ, and watch the available videos. The next time you need to edit packets, you’ll be well armed and ready to do so with WireEdit, and you won’t be pulling your hair out trying to accomplish it quickly, effectively, and correctly. WireEdit my a huge leap from not known to me to the top five on my favorite tools list. WireEdit is everything it is claimed to be. Outstanding.
Ping me via email or Twitter if you have questions: russ at holisticinfosec dot org or @holisticinfosec.
ACK
Thanks to Michael Sukhar for WireEdit and Packet Watcher for the great suggestion. Continue reading toolsmith #114: WireEdit and Deep Packet Modification
With some of my new found flexibility (not bound to print deadlines) I’m now able to provide near-realtime toolsmith content in direct response to recommendations or interaction via social media (@holisticinfosec), and other avenues. Just another service provided by your friendly neighborhood toolsmith. 🙂 Such is the case as we discuss Erik Hjelmvik’s CapLoader. We’re connecting a few strands in our beautifully enmeshed community here. First, we discussed Erik’s outstanding NetworkMiner in November 2011. Erik’s tools have done nothing but improve since, and CapLoader, as part of those regular improvements, came to fruition to answer the “large file” problem. Second, in May 2015, when I discussed Hunting in-memory adversaries with Rekall and WinPmem I created a fairly sizable memory image (5GB) that included network activity from a compromised host to an attacker-controlled resource. When, via Twitter, I announced that I’m presenting related content to a 2015 Northwest Regional ICAC Conference audience on 5 OCT, Erik replied to remind me that, if I hadn’t already, to try and carve packets from my memory dump with CapLoader, and that I’ll be amazed. As a jaded, crusty, and exponentially aging security practitioner, I’m not easily amazed, so I took the challenge and told him “I’m going to do u one better. Next #toolsmith to be about CapLoader inspecting the memory image specifically created for this talk.” And here we are! The HolisticInfoSec circle of life.
As CapLoader’s network carving from memory feature has been available for more than a year, and it was nicely written up for you on the Netresec blog, I’ll point you to Erik’s March 2014 post as your starting point, along with the above mentioned WinPmem/Rekall article. CapLoader is easily downloaded and installed on modern Windows systems, your only dependency is .NET Framework 4.0. The free version will provide all the network packet carving magic you need, but I also tested the commercial version with a license provided by Erik.
I’m going to give you some perfomance benchmarks as well as we go along.
Here’s how easy it was to put CapLoader 1.3.1 Trial to use on the compromised.raw memory image from the WinPmem/Rekall article.
 |
| Figure 1: CapLoader memory image network carving options |
Exactly 76 seconds later, the free, trial version of CapLoader extracted 32 flows from 23 hosts from a 5GB memory image acquired via WinPmem. Sorry, this isn’t amazing, it’s amazeballs. I can’t express how fast that is for functionality of this nature. There, awaiting further analysis, was compromised.raw.pcapng. Better still, I wanted to just focus on flows for two hosts, 192.168.177.130 (attacker) and 192.168.177.129 (victim). CapLoader includes an Auto-extract flows on select feature, I just highlighted these two flows, and BLAM!, they were written out to a new PCAPNG file as seen in Figure 2.
 |
| Figure 2: Selected flows |
Just double-click the PCAP CapLoader logo in the upper-right quadrant of the CapLoader UI and it’ll open the selected flows in Wireshark (if installed) automatically. You can also just click File then Save Selected Flows. In addition to Wireshark analysis, what’s the most obvious next step given that we’re talking about a Netresec tool here? Yes! Use NetworkMiner. One small note: if you have any issues moving between PCAPNG and PCAP files (the free version of NetworkMiner doesn’t open PCAPNG files) you can use PcapNG.com (also a Netresec service) to convert captures smaller than 8MB.
I repeated the exercise with the commercial version of CapLoader with two additional features enabled, Identify Protocols and Show Countries, and in 72 seconds (four seconds faster than our first run with the trial version) had my results.
After all this though, the resulting network capture was not much use as I had pushed my Meterpreter session for the Rekall discussion over HTTPS, but you get the point. Had network traffic ensued via a clear-text protocol, CapLoader’s ability to rapidly carve it out of a memory image would have been invaluable.
To prove that point, I’ll give you one quick unrelated example. Using the commercial copy of CapLoader, I loaded a different memory image where misuse of MSN Messenger was in play. In exactly 22 seconds for this 1GB memory image, and a bit of column sorting, I was able to instantly visualize the Messeger traffic using the CapLoader Gantt feature as seen in Figure 3.
 |
| Figure 3: CapLoader Gantt chart visual |
CapLoader is wonderful stuff indeed from Erik and Netresec, loved the suggestion to explore it in the context of the Hunting in-memory adversaries with Rekall and WinPmem presentation, and as always, look forward to what’s next from Erik. Follow Erik via @netresec and ping me via email or Twitter if you have questions (russ at holisticinfosec dot org or @holisticinfosec).
Cheers…until next time. Continue reading toolsmith #109: CapLoader network carving from Rekall WinPmem Memory Image
With some of my new found flexibility (not bound to print deadlines) I’m now able to provide near-realtime toolsmith content in direct response to recommendations or interaction via social media (@holisticinfosec), and other avenues. Just another service provided by your friendly neighborhood toolsmith. 🙂 Such is the case as we discuss Erik Hjelmvik’s CapLoader. We’re connecting a few strands in our beautifully enmeshed community here. First, we discussed Erik’s outstanding NetworkMiner in November 2011. Erik’s tools have done nothing but improve since, and CapLoader, as part of those regular improvements, came to fruition to answer the “large file” problem. Second, in May 2015, when I discussed Hunting in-memory adversaries with Rekall and WinPmem I created a fairly sizable memory image (5GB) that included network activity from a compromised host to an attacker-controlled resource. When, via Twitter, I announced that I’m presenting related content to a 2015 Northwest Regional ICAC Conference audience on 5 OCT, Erik replied to remind me that, if I hadn’t already, to try and carve packets from my memory dump with CapLoader, and that I’ll be amazed. As a jaded, crusty, and exponentially aging security practitioner, I’m not easily amazed, so I took the challenge and told him “I’m going to do u one better. Next #toolsmith to be about CapLoader inspecting the memory image specifically created for this talk.” And here we are! The HolisticInfoSec circle of life.
As CapLoader’s network carving from memory feature has been available for more than a year, and it was nicely written up for you on the Netresec blog, I’ll point you to Erik’s March 2014 post as your starting point, along with the above mentioned WinPmem/Rekall article. CapLoader is easily downloaded and installed on modern Windows systems, your only dependency is .NET Framework 4.0. The free version will provide all the network packet carving magic you need, but I also tested the commercial version with a license provided by Erik.
I’m going to give you some perfomance benchmarks as well as we go along.
Here’s how easy it was to put CapLoader 1.3.1 Trial to use on the compromised.raw memory image from the WinPmem/Rekall article.
|
| Figure 1: CapLoader memory image network carving options |
Exactly 76 seconds later, the free, trial version of CapLoader extracted 32 flows from 23 hosts from a 5GB memory image acquired via WinPmem. Sorry, this isn’t amazing, it’s amazeballs. I can’t express how fast that is for functionality of this nature. There, awaiting further analysis, was compromised.raw.pcapng. Better still, I wanted to just focus on flows for two hosts, 192.168.177.130 (attacker) and 192.168.177.129 (victim). CapLoader includes an Auto-extract flows on select feature, I just highlighted these two flows, and BLAM!, they were written out to a new PCAPNG file as seen in Figure 2.
|
| Figure 2: Selected flows |
Just double-click the PCAP CapLoader logo in the upper-right quadrant of the CapLoader UI and it’ll open the selected flows in Wireshark (if installed) automatically. You can also just click File then Save Selected Flows. In addition to Wireshark analysis, what’s the most obvious next step given that we’re talking about a Netresec tool here? Yes! Use NetworkMiner. One small note: if you have any issues moving between PCAPNG and PCAP files (the free version of NetworkMiner doesn’t open PCAPNG files) you can use PcapNG.com (also a Netresec service) to convert captures smaller than 8MB.
I repeated the exercise with the commercial version of CapLoader with two additional features enabled, Identify Protocols and Show Countries, and in 72 seconds (four seconds faster than our first run with the trial version) had my results.
After all this though, the resulting network capture was not much use as I had pushed my Meterpreter session for the Rekall discussion over HTTPS, but you get the point. Had network traffic ensued via a clear-text protocol, CapLoader’s ability to rapidly carve it out of a memory image would have been invaluable.
To prove that point, I’ll give you one quick unrelated example. Using the commercial copy of CapLoader, I loaded a different memory image where misuse of MSN Messenger was in play. In exactly 22 seconds for this 1GB memory image, and a bit of column sorting, I was able to instantly visualize the Messeger traffic using the CapLoader Gantt feature as seen in Figure 3.
|
| Figure 3: CapLoader Gantt chart visual |
CapLoader is wonderful stuff indeed from Erik and Netresec, loved the suggestion to explore it in the context of the Hunting in-memory adversaries with Rekall and WinPmem presentation, and as always, look forward to what’s next from Erik. Follow Erik via @netresec and ping me via email or Twitter if you have questions (russ at holisticinfosec dot org or @holisticinfosec).
Cheers…until next time. Continue reading toolsmith #109: CapLoader network carving from Rekall WinPmem Memory Image