user namespaces: do they increase security, or introduce new attack surface?

user namespaces in Linux are presented as a security feature, which should increase security. But is this really true?
Is it possible that while user namespaces fix one kind of problem, they introduce another, unexpected, problem with pote… Continue reading user namespaces: do they increase security, or introduce new attack surface?

Can I know kernel address layout and memory mapped IO layout from the user privilege in linux kernel?

My current understanding is that the user does not have any way of knowing the kernel address space layout due to the protection mechanisms such as Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR).
However, I see that if I use cat /proc/i… Continue reading Can I know kernel address layout and memory mapped IO layout from the user privilege in linux kernel?

fscrypt master key handling at kernel space adding additional secure params

In fscrypt, master key is received from userspace and actual encryption keys are derived from this master key using KDF. If any other process is able to get hold of the master key, they can unlock the encrypted directory and access the con… Continue reading fscrypt master key handling at kernel space adding additional secure params

Capabilities DROP in container of Kubernetes pod running with specific UID

I am doing some security research on Kubernetes and I found something still mysterious to me, concerning capabilities.
Example of simple pod:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: my-pod-httpd
spec:
containers:
– name: my-pod-http… Continue reading Capabilities DROP in container of Kubernetes pod running with specific UID