Security Risks of Deriving Crypto Wallet Seed Phrases Using Deterministically Derived Salt

I’m working on a project where I want to generate a set of crypto wallet seed phrases from an existing seed phrase. The reason for this is so that using just the original seed phrase the wallet holder can access multiple connected accounts… Continue reading Security Risks of Deriving Crypto Wallet Seed Phrases Using Deterministically Derived Salt

Model Extraction from Neural Networks

A new paper, “Polynomial Time Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Network Models,” by Adi Shamir and others, uses ideas from differential cryptanalysis to extract the weights inside a neural network using specific queries and their results. This is much more theoretical than practical, but it’s a really interesting result.

Abstract:

Billions of dollars and countless GPU hours are currently spent on training Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for a variety of tasks. Thus, it is essential to determine the difficulty of extracting all the parameters of such neural networks when given access to their black-box implementations. Many versions of this problem have been studied over the last 30 years, and the best current attack on ReLU-based deep neural networks was presented at Crypto’20 by Carlini, Jagielski, and Mironov. It resembles a differential chosen plaintext attack on a cryptosystem, which has a secret key embedded in its black-box implementation and requires a polynomial number of queries but an exponential amount of time (as a function of the number of neurons). In this paper, we improve this attack by developing several new techniques that enable us to extract with arbitrarily high precision all the real-valued parameters of a ReLU-based DNN using a polynomial number of queries and a polynomial amount of time. We demonstrate its practical efficiency by applying it to a full-sized neural network for classifying the CIFAR10 dataset, which has 3072 inputs, 8 hidden layers with 256 neurons each, and about 1.2 million neuronal parameters. An attack following the approach by Carlini et al. requires an exhaustive search over 2^256 possibilities. Our attack replaces this with our new techniques, which require only 30 minutes on a 256-core computer…

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Why is the "intermediate" challenge needed in Bluetooth ECDH since the "real" verification is performed at the end with code comparison?

Why is step 4 needed? What does it protect in terms of security? Doesn’t the protection arrives from the last step so when Va and Vb (so called TK, Temporary Keys) are compared?
Other thing: I read somewhere that Cb is sent immediately an… Continue reading Why is the "intermediate" challenge needed in Bluetooth ECDH since the "real" verification is performed at the end with code comparison?