What might one want to accomplish by running ffmpeg -i video.mp4 -map 0 -map_metadata 0:s:0 -c copy video.mp4 in terms of forensics?

In the eighth episode of the second series of Mr. Robot, Trenton
does this to the video that was recorded by a VHS camera before releasing it to the public via Vimeo.
ffmpeg -i fuxFBI.mp4 -map 0 -map_metadata 0:s:0 -c copy fuxFBI.mp4
From … Continue reading What might one want to accomplish by running ffmpeg -i video.mp4 -map 0 -map_metadata 0:s:0 -c copy video.mp4 in terms of forensics?

How might I rate-limit in nginx against a distributed attacker that has set the number of parallel connections in xerxes to 1?

An attacker tweaks xerxes by setting the number of CONNECTIONS in xerxes to 1 instead of 8, like so:
#define CONNECTIONS 1

They then attack with xerxes-executable mydomain 433.
Their strategy is to use eight time less connections from eac… Continue reading How might I rate-limit in nginx against a distributed attacker that has set the number of parallel connections in xerxes to 1?

What other than ping tools might be suitable for overwhelming a server that has disabled its functionality of being pinged? [closed]

The following code:
#!/usr/bin/bash

TARGETS=("nalog.gov.ru" "www.nalog.gov.ru"
"customs.gov.ru" "www.customs.gov.ru"
"ffs.ru" "www.ffs.ru"
"crimea-post.ru" "www.c… Continue reading What other than ping tools might be suitable for overwhelming a server that has disabled its functionality of being pinged? [closed]

Why is it not a good idea to simply encrypt the plaintext with the receiver’s public key? [duplicate]

What are some of the risks when encrypting “plaintext” with a receiver’s public key?

I have been Googling for hours, and been reading in the Computer Security Principles and Practice 3rd edition.

It’s NOT similar:
In PGP, why not just encrypt message with recipient’s public key? Why the meta-encryption?

Continue reading Why is it not a good idea to simply encrypt the plaintext with the receiver’s public key? [duplicate]

Syscalls are disabled with seccomp. What attacks are still possible? How to prevent them?

I want to run a piece of untrusted code on my machine.
I’ve disabled all syscalls (besides exit, sigreturn, read and write) with seccomp for a process. Now, I’d like to spawn a child process that will execute the untrusted code.

What atta… Continue reading Syscalls are disabled with seccomp. What attacks are still possible? How to prevent them?