Collaborate Disseminate
I’m new to SS7 security and have been looking into SS7 hacks. What I was wondering was if there are other ways hackers can gain access to SS7 networks other than creating an app using the SS7 SDK because that’s what most of videos I’ve wat… Continue reading SS7 attack possibilities
Will using a Wpa3 router with VPN tethering function to share a 3g modem network protect someone from the vulnerabilities in a 3g network?
I know there are 4g and 5g, I just want to know how much is possible to build securely on an insecur… Continue reading Assuming 3g network is vulnerable, will it be also vulnerable if I tether it using a VPN router? [closed]
Is a remote control using a fake tower then downgrade 4g to 3g with the help radio commands possible ?
How such an attack is managed on a smartphone for example ?
Continue reading How a remote exploit over 3g using radio waves commands is established? [closed]
After watching a video course about SS7 attacks and remote control flaws through WiFi adapters of smartphones, a question comes to my mind:
If an adversary can intercept your SS7 traffic and relate it to his own internet, he can obviously … Continue reading Does SS7 attack cause malicious apps to install on your phone?
After watching a video course about ss7 attacks and remote control flaws through wifi adapters of smartphones a question come to my mind if an adversary can intercept your ss7 traffic and relate it to his own internet he can obviously auto… Continue reading Does ss7 attack cause malicious apps to install on your phone?
I have read about SS7 attacks a lot, but I didn’t find any explanation on how to connect to SS7 and interrupt messages.
How do you connect to SS7? I only know you should search for an entry point, and that is all.
Can an attacker intercept my mobile traffic exploiting the ss7 vulnerability even if encrypted?
Continue reading Can an attacker intercept mobile traffic exploiting SS7 vulnerability?
A private surveillance firm that exploits mobile network vulnerabilities to spy on calls, texts and location data is doing business with at least 25 governments around the globe, including some with histories of human rights abuses, concludes a report released Tuesday. The findings from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab scrutinize the work of the company Circles, which is a sister firm of the Israeli software surveillance broker NSO Group. Human rights activists frequently criticize NSO Group for selling its equipment to repressive regimes, a charge it rejects, even as it is the subject of a lawsuit from Facebook, which alleges that attackers used NSO Group tech to spy on thousands of WhatsApp users. The countries Citizen Lab identified as “likely” customers of Circles: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Serbia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. […]
The post Researchers suggest 25 countries are using a kind of mobile spyware that monitors texts, location appeared first on CyberScoop.
I want try to make some strategy hypothesis against SS7 information stealing. The following are my hypothesis and I’d like to have your opinion if they can work.
Go to live in France, I read here that the gsm France Network is much robust… Continue reading Strategy to defend againt SS7 informations stealing
Interesting research: SRLabs founder Karsten Nohl, a researcher with a track record of exposing security flaws in telephony systems, argues that RCS is in many ways no better than SS7, the decades-old phone system carriers still used for calling and texting, which has long been known to be vulnerable to interception and spoofing attacks. While using end-to-end encrypted internet-based tools… Continue reading Security Vulnerabilities in the RCS Texting Protocol