Collaborate Disseminate
Here is the code:
import struct
buf = ""
buf += "A" * 552
buf += struct.pack(‘<Q’, 0x401493) # pop rdi; ret
buf += struct.pack(‘<Q’, 0x7ffff7f79152) # /bin/sh
buf += struct.pack(‘<Q’, 0x7ffff7e37e50) # syste… Continue reading ROP executes system("/bin/sh") but does not attach to it
I’m confused now about how the order is set up for the ROP chain.
Let’s say we’d like to make a chain below
in C:
open("myfile", O_RDONLY);
read(3, buf, 100);
in payload:
p32(OPEN_ADDR)
p32(PPR) # pop pop ret
p32(FILE_ADDR_BUF)
… Continue reading Question about RTL (or ROP) chaining order
The standard OpenSSL build with the FIPS option will use a base address for libeay64.dll of 0xFB00000.
Since the FIPS module is not re-locatable, it cannot take part in Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR),
which is an important part … Continue reading Should using a FIPS capable OpenSSL implementation be avoided?
I have the following program:
#include<stdio.h>
int main() {
int i=0;
foo();
printf("Hello there!");
func();
}
int foo(void) {
char str[14];
strncpy(str,"General Kenobi", 14)
prin… Continue reading Trouble understanding buffer overflow to print a string
I’m doing a pretty bog-standard return-to-libc attack and I’m in a bit of a pickle.
I first got the entire attack working with my local version of libc, then I used the version of libc provided by the challenge to work out the offsets on t… Continue reading Segfault after reaching system
I am trying to solve a CTF challenge which involves return oriented programming. The challenge is here:
https://ctflearn.com/challenge/1012
I used the ROPgadget tool to search for gadgets in the binary and found these instructions that cou… Continue reading Retrieving data in a particular address found from ROPgadget
Being gadgets change per each system and architecture (do they?), how would an attacker be able to determine the offsets of various Return Oriented Programming gadgets, would an attacker first need to determine:
-The operating system?
-The… Continue reading How do attackers determine ROP gadgets remotely?
I see that intel and other hardware companies have spend a lot of effort introducing the shadow stack in intel cet.
The questions is of course why? canary gives similar functionality , and according to some benchmarks takes by performance…. Continue reading why shadow stack if I can canary?
let say hacker want to come over the aslr or he want to call function that doesn’t exists in user program ,can he insert to the return address address to the share library function or this functions being load only when the user program c… Continue reading is it possible to call libc function with rop
I recently was studying x86 buffer overflows + ret2libc attacks from https://www.ret2rop.com/2018/08/return-to-libc.html and I noticed the order is as follows:
bytes to fill buffer + address of system + return address for system/address of… Continue reading Understanding ret2libc return address location