Collaborate Disseminate
How can I keep data preserved between ECALLs? (not nested ECALLs) I found two ways: a global array 2)seal data, transfer them outside the enclave and transfer them back inside with the next ECALL, unseal and to recover the current state. A… Continue reading Intel SGX Enclave store data between ECALLs
I am studying some published papers that demonstrate how I can a secure file system been implemented with the assistance of Intel SGX.
However, in each one of these papers, the threat model is not clearly defined. I know that SGX prevents … Continue reading File System with SGX assistance threat model
I’ve read this article about Intel SGX
Under Instructions, it says
All these instructions are implemented in micro-code (so that their behavior can be modified)
Are users able to modify the micro-code of Intel SGX instructions, or is thi… Continue reading Who can modify the micro-code of instructions in Intel SGX?
From the perspective of security and privacy protection in Machine Learning (ML), I’m wondering why are there few applications combining AMD SEV and ML?
Speaking of SGX, there are multiple ML applications developed with SGX, e.g., addressi… Continue reading TEE applications: AMD SEV vs Intel SGX
What am I doing wrong with using xbegin in the enclave?
First of all, I checked tsx outside enclave – it works (I tested _xbegin() from <immintrin.h>).
Then I tried to use different examples of xbegin realisations for !Windows! insid… Continue reading TSX xbegin in SGX enclave (Windows)
A trusted execution environment (TEE) provides a way for one to deploy tamper-proof programs on a device. The most prominent example of TEEs seem to be Intel SGX for PCs.
What I wonder is, if there exists an equivalent solution for mobile… Continue reading What Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) solutions exist for mobile devices?
I just read an article about the Thunderspy vulnerabilities.
What I think I understood so for is that with physical access, it is possible to manipulate the memory of the computer via Thunderbolt and that it can also read data from memory… Continue reading Questions about Thunderspy mitigation
An application running under Intel SGX can invoke EGETKEY to obtain an encryption key from the CPU HW. The same key will be obtained each time the application is run. This allows the application to encrypt data with the key (a/k/a seal it … Continue reading AMD SEV equivalent of Intel SGX EGETKEY?
Is it possible to store the master decryption key for accessing a LUKS encrypted volume inside an SGX enclave so that the master key cannot be accessed by any user on the system, even the root user with privileges to make system calls?
Intel’s March security updates reached its customers this week and the dominant theme is the bundle of flaws affecting Graphics drivers. Continue reading Intel patches graphics drivers and offers new LVI flaw mitigations