Does PKCS 1.5 padding make it possible for an attacker to extract the private key or not? Is PKCS 1.5 safe to use in authentication context?

Im currently writing a authentication app based on RSA, for Android that should be impossible to copy, even if you have physical access to a phone without lockscreen/PIN.

However, the HSM inside the phone, that ensures the p… Continue reading Does PKCS 1.5 padding make it possible for an attacker to extract the private key or not? Is PKCS 1.5 safe to use in authentication context?

Does PKCS 1.5 padding make it possible for an attacker to extract the private key or not? Is PKCS 1.5 safe to use in authentication context?

Im currently writing a authentication app based on RSA, for Android that should be impossible to copy, even if you have physical access to a phone without lockscreen/PIN.

However, the HSM inside the phone, that ensures the p… Continue reading Does PKCS 1.5 padding make it possible for an attacker to extract the private key or not? Is PKCS 1.5 safe to use in authentication context?

Is there any security risk, if the database with key handles for U2F devices are leaked?

Is there any risk, if a database of U2F device key handles are leaked?

Enrolling a key works by:

Send Enroll request with “AppID” to U2F device.
U2F device answers with “Key Handle, Public Key”.

Authentication works by:
Continue reading Is there any security risk, if the database with key handles for U2F devices are leaked?