Collaborate Disseminate
Have you ever tried using LLVM’s X-Ray profiling tools to make some flame graphs, but gotten obscure errors like: ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency for TSC accounting. ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency. Or worse, have you profil… Continue reading TSC Frequency For All: Better Profiling and Benchmarking
It is time for the second installment of our efforts to reproduce original fuzzing research on modern systems. If you haven’t yet, please read the first part. This time we tackle fuzzing on Windows by reproducing the results of “An Empirica… Continue reading Fuzzing In The Year 2000
With 2019 a day away, let’s reflect on the past to see how we can improve. Yes, let’s take a long look back 30 years and reflect on the original fuzzing paper, An Empirical Study of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities, and its 1995 follow-up,… Continue reading Fuzzing Like It’s 1989
Today, we’re going to talk about a hard problem that we are working on as part of DARPA’s Cyber Fault-Tolerant Attack Recovery (CFAR) program: automatically protecting software from 0-day exploits, memory corruption, and many currently undi… Continue reading Protecting Software Against Exploitation with DARPA’s CFAR
This is the second half of our blog post on the Meltdown an Spectre vulnerabilities, describing Spectre Variant 1 (V1) and Spectre Variant 2 (V2). If you have not done so already, please review the first blog post for an accessible review of computer a… Continue reading An accessible overview of Meltdown and Spectre, Part 2
In the past few weeks the details of two critical design flaws in modern processors were finally revealed to the public. Much has been written about the impact of Meltdown and Spectre, but there is scant detail about what these attacks are and how they… Continue reading An accessible overview of Meltdown and Spectre, Part 1
This blog has promoted control flow integrity (CFI) as a game changing security mitigation and encouraged its use. We wanted to take our own security advice and start securing software we use. To that end, we decided to apply CFI to facebook’s osquery, a cross-platform codebase with which we are deeply familiar. Using osquery, we […]
Continue reading The Challenges of Deploying Security Mitigations
We’re back with our promised second installment discussing control flow integrity. This time, we will talk about Microsoft’s implementation of control flow integrity. As a reminder, control flow integrity, or CFI, is an exploit mitigation technique that prevents bugs from turning into exploits. For a more detailed explanation, please read the first post in this […]
Continue reading Let’s talk about CFI: Microsoft Edition
Our previous blog posts often mentioned control flow integrity, or CFI, but we have never explained what CFI is, how to use it, or why you should care. It’s time to remedy the situation! In this blog post, we’ll explain, at a high level, what CFI is, what it does, what it doesn’t do, and […]
Continue reading Let’s talk about CFI: clang edition
Today, Facebook announced the successful completion of our work: osquery for Windows. “Today, we’re excited to announce the availability of an osquery developer kit for Windows so security teams can build customized solutions for their Windows networks… This port of osquery to Windows gives you the ability to unify endpoint defense and participate in an […]
Continue reading Windows network security now easier with osquery