Collaborate Disseminate
In late April 2018, a new zero-day vulnerability for Internet Explorer (IE) was found using our sandbox; more than two years since the last in the wild example (CVE-2016-0189). This particular vulnerability and subsequent exploit are interesting for many reasons. Continue reading The King is dead. Long live the King!
This report by Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT presents information on identified servers that have been infected and used by the Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti group. The report also includes the findings of an analysis of several webservers compromised by the group during 2016 and in early 2017. Continue reading Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers
While analyzing some memory dumps suspicious of being infected with a keylogger, we identified a library containing strings to interact with a virtual file system. This turned out to be a malicious loader internally named “Slingshot”. Continue reading The Slingshot APT FAQ
In our previous blog , we detailed our findings about the attack against the Pyeongchang 2018 WinterOlympics. For this investigation, our analysts were provided with administrative access to one of the affected servers located in a hotel based in Pyeongchang county, South Korea. In addition, we collected all available evidence from various private and public sources and worked with several companies on investigating the C&C infrastructure associated with the attackers. Continue reading The devil’s in the Rich header
A couple of days after the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, we received information from several partners, on the condition of non-disclosure (TLP:Red), about a devastating malware attack on the Olympic infrastructure. Continue reading OlympicDestroyer is here to trick the industry
Sofacy, also known as APT28, Fancy Bear, and Tsar Team, is a highly active and prolific APT. From their high volume 0day deployment to their innovative and broad malware set, Sofacy is one of the top groups that we monitor, report, and protect against. 2017 was not any different in this regard. Continue reading A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity
A search online lead me to a discovery I didn’t think was possible nowadays. I realized almost immediately that critical security issues were probably involved. I found that out of the many tens of thousands of gas stations the company claimed to have installed their product in, 1,000 are remotely hackable. Continue reading Gas is too expensive? Let’s make it cheap!
At the end of September, Palo Alto released a report on Unit42 activity where they – among other things – talked about PYLOT malware. We have been detecting attacks that have employed the use of this backdoor since at least 2015 and refer to it as Travle. Coincidentally, KL was recently involved in an investigation of a successful attack where Travle was detected, during which we conducted a deep analysis of this malware. Continue reading Travle aka PYLOT backdoor hits Russian-speaking targets
In 2017, Kaspersky Lab’s web antivirus detected 15 714 700 unique malicious objects (scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.) and 199 455 606 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components. Kaspersky Lab solutions detected and repelled 1 188 728 338 malicious attacks launched from online resources located in 206 countries all over the world. Continue reading Kaspersky Security Bulletin. Overall statistics for 2017
The end of the year is a good time to take stock of the main cyberthreat incidents that took place over the preceding 12 months or so. To reflect on the impact these events had on organizations and individuals, and consider what they could mean for the overall evolution of the threat landscape. Continue reading Kaspersky Security Bulletin: Review of the Year 2017