33C3: If You Can’t Trust Your Computer, Who Can You Trust?

It’s a sign of the times: the first day of the 33rd Chaos Communications Congress (33C3) included two talks related to assuring that your own computer wasn’t being turned against you. The two talks are respectively practical and idealistic, realizable today and a work that’s still in the idea stage.

In the first talk, [Trammell Hudson] presented his Heads open-source firmware bootloader and minimal Linux for laptops and servers. The name is a gag: the Tails Linux distribution lets you operate without leaving any trace, while Heads lets you run a system that you can be reasonably sure is secure. …read more

Continue reading 33C3: If You Can’t Trust Your Computer, Who Can You Trust?

How are TPMs provisioned for Intel Trusted Execution Environment (TXT)?

For Intel TXT to work, the TPM must be provisioned. Intel provides some tools for doing this but many are protected by non-public login or an NDA. Many OEM platform vendors provision their boards and machines at manufacturing time so an e… Continue reading How are TPMs provisioned for Intel Trusted Execution Environment (TXT)?

In practice, does TPM SRK really be decrypted by EK first, before it decrypt its child keys

I know that TPM SRK was generated when user take TPM ownership, and it is encrypted by EK public part. All the child keys under SRK need to be loaded into TPM and decrypted by SRK before use. (These are what the books tell us… Continue reading In practice, does TPM SRK really be decrypted by EK first, before it decrypt its child keys

What, or who, exactly is a Certificate Authority (CA) for TPM attestation?

I’m learning about and researching the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to incorporate into a solution involving remote machines.

As I understand it: all attestation methods (AIK, DAA) still require someone to know your identit… Continue reading What, or who, exactly is a Certificate Authority (CA) for TPM attestation?