Shred, cut, melt, smash, grind, then flush, is it secure disposal of a security access id card?

I had a card like a credit card that I used to use for work. It was an ID card, and it had an access code, a swiper, a barcode, my picture, my name, my rank, my license, the name of the company, and the address of the building where my com… Continue reading Shred, cut, melt, smash, grind, then flush, is it secure disposal of a security access id card?

Need expert help regarding a long term targeted attack,mount infected partition safetly and other security questions [Thinkpad T450] [closed]

I’ve got a t450 thinkpad and am under a targeted attack most likely by physical contact with my device (shared house).
I need to format all my partitions but first preferably mount them on a chrooted session to copy some desirable files, s… Continue reading Need expert help regarding a long term targeted attack,mount infected partition safetly and other security questions [Thinkpad T450] [closed]

What type of attacks can be carried against an OS with FDE, if we assume OS and FDE are implemented correctly?

The question is mainly stated in the title. I was wondering what kind of attacks can be launched on such a setup, where someone has access to a running OS with locked screen (needs password for the user to enter). One possibility I can thi… Continue reading What type of attacks can be carried against an OS with FDE, if we assume OS and FDE are implemented correctly?

How hard is it to modify UEFI nvram if the device is off and the UEFI is locked?

This assumes that:

Machine is powered off
No UEFI backdoors
No Reflashing the firmware
No clearing the NVRAM (The point is to modify/read a small amount of NVRAM, instead of resetting it)
Device requires password to POST (Enforced by BIOS… Continue reading How hard is it to modify UEFI nvram if the device is off and the UEFI is locked?