Is gnupg2 –refresh-keys susceptible to any attacks based on fingerprint collisions?

Alice updates her OpenPGP key yearly. Bob updates his copy using: gpg2 –refresh-keys

Mallory ensures that Bob uses her keyserver, which offers her own key, which

is sharing the 32-bit “short” Key ID with Alice
is sharing … Continue reading Is gnupg2 –refresh-keys susceptible to any attacks based on fingerprint collisions?

Is forward secrecy useful for an application where keeping message history is an integral part?

I am writing a decentralized application that lets certain privileged users post messages to other users. These messages should be encrypted so that only the two of them can read it. Messages are posted onto IPFS, so that any… Continue reading Is forward secrecy useful for an application where keeping message history is an integral part?

With GPG, can 3rd party verify that message has been encrypted by specific public key?

Bob is sending message X to Alice. He encrypts X with Alice’s public key using gpg and sends her encrypted message (ciphertext).

Later Alice claims that Bob made a mistake and the ciphertext was not created with her public key.

Can Bob p… Continue reading With GPG, can 3rd party verify that message has been encrypted by specific public key?

Are there any known collisions of a "long" (64 bit) OpenPGP key ID?

We know that the “short” 32 bit OpenPGP key IDs can be easily brute-forced and the recommendation is to use the “long” 64 bit IDs or full 160 bit SHA1 fingerprint. However I am concerned that the “long” key IDs may also be b… Continue reading Are there any known collisions of a "long" (64 bit) OpenPGP key ID?