What is the risk of lenient CORS header for a webapplication that stores tokens in sessionStorage and not in cookies?

Let’s assume we have a web-application that stores its auth token in the browser’s sessionStorage/localStorage and does not use cookies. If I’m not completely mistaken, such a web application is not vulnerable against CSRF attacks, right?
Continue reading What is the risk of lenient CORS header for a webapplication that stores tokens in sessionStorage and not in cookies?

How to securely allow localhost to access through CORS, without exposing it to anyone’s localhost?

It is recommended to do this often in web apps:
import { NextResponse } from ‘next/server’
import type { NextRequest } from ‘next/server’

// Define allowed origins
const allowedOrigins = [
‘http://localhost:3000’,
‘http://localhost:30… Continue reading How to securely allow localhost to access through CORS, without exposing it to anyone’s localhost?

Understanding Cross-Domain Cookies and `SameSite` Attributes with Express.js and Third-Party Tracking

What I have understood (I guess):

Cross-origin Cookies:
Cookies set with Domain="example.com" are not sent with fetch requests from origins like hello.example2.com to mywebsite.example.com because they are different domains. How… Continue reading Understanding Cross-Domain Cookies and `SameSite` Attributes with Express.js and Third-Party Tracking

Risks with having a "localhost" service configured on a production SAML/OAuth/OIDC Identity Provider

To help developers with integrating with our SAML/OAuth/OIDC Identity Provider on their local dev environments, I’m thinking about configuring a demo client/app in our production IdP that has localhost configured as valid redirect url (OAu… Continue reading Risks with having a "localhost" service configured on a production SAML/OAuth/OIDC Identity Provider