/proxy/ URL scans with IP addresses, (Mon, Mar 16th)

Attempts to find proxy servers are among the most common scans our honeypots detect. Most of the time, the attacker attempts to use a host header or include the hostname in the URL to trigger the proxy server forwarding the request. In some cases, common URL prefixes like “/proxy/” are used. This weekend, I noticed a slightly different pattern in our logs:

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A React-based phishing page with credential exfiltration via EmailJS, (Fri, Mar 13th)

On Wednesday, a phishing message made its way into our handler inbox that contained a fairly typical low-quality lure, but turned out to be quite interesting in the end nonetheless. That is because the accompanying credential stealing web page was dynamically constructed using React and used a legitimate e-mail service for credential collection.

Continue reading A React-based phishing page with credential exfiltration via EmailJS, (Fri, Mar 13th)

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