A “Stream O” Maldoc, (Fri, Jul 5th)
Reader Robert submitted a malicious document. It just happens to be a maldoc with the payload hidden in a user form, as discussed in diary entry “Maldoc: Payloads in User Forms” last weekend.
Collaborate Disseminate
Reader Robert submitted a malicious document. It just happens to be a maldoc with the payload hidden in a user form, as discussed in diary entry “Maldoc: Payloads in User Forms” last weekend.
A bit unusual diary entry on this day.
Pastebin.com remains a common way to download malicious data and/or scripts. A few days ago, I spotted this malicious script that got a very low score on VT: 3/57 (SHA56:45e45d2932816b14665f65ee4fc1aa7473b29031da1612d3d909f867c618d80e)&#;x26;#;x5b;1&#;x26;#;x5d;. The obfuscation wasn&#;x26;#;39;t very complex but remains quite effective. The script is just a downloader that fetches more content from pastebin.com as well as other sites.
Continue reading Malicious Script With Multiple Payloads, (Tue, Jul 2nd)
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Continue reading ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, July 3rd 2019 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6564, (Wed, Jul 3rd)
Now that we have the hashes for all the running processes in the AD Domain, and also have the VT Score for each hash in the system, how can we use this information&#;x26;#;x3f;&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; Incident Response comes immediately to mind for me.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; If you&#;x26;#;39;ve ever been in a medium-to-large-scale “incident”, the situation that you often find is &#;x26;#;39;we know everything seems to be infected, but out of thousands of machines, which ones are actually infected right now&#;x26;#;x3f;&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; Not only that, but “our AV doesn&#;x26;#;39;t detect this exact malware yet, or if it does, it detects it but doesn&#;x26;#;39;t kill it or delete it”.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; The methods we&#;x26;#;39;ve looked at these last few days allow us to enumerate an up to the minute list of infected stations, outputting a “punch list” for the responders fixing those stations.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; Not only that, but we can tack on a “kill switch” command that will terminate (and even delete) the running malware if the AV product isn&#;x26;#;39;t doing that.
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Continue reading ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, July 2nd 2019 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6562, (Tue, Jul 2nd)
When malicious Office documents leveraging VBA code became popular again with malware authors, they soon started to look for different places to hide their payload (URLs, commands, shellcode, EXEs, …). User Forms were one of the first components they turned to.
Continue reading Maldoc: Payloads in User Forms, (Mon, Jul 1st)
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Continue reading ISC Stormcast For Sunday, June 30th 2019 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6560, (Sun, Jun 30th)
Over the last few days we&#;x26;#;39;ve:
Continue reading Verifying Running Processes against VirusTotal – Domain-Wide, (Fri, Jun 28th)
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. Continue reading ISC Stormcast For Friday, June 28th 2019 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6558, (Thu, Jun 27th)