Formbook Delivered Through Multiple Scripts, (Thu, Nov 13th)

When I’m teachning FOR610[1], I always say to my students that reverse engineering does not only apply to “executable files” (read: PE or ELF files). Most of the time, the infection path involves many stages to defeat the Security Analyst or security controls. Here is an example that I found yesterday. An email was received via an attached ZIP archive. It contained a simple file: “Payment_confirmation_copy_30K__202512110937495663904650431.vbs” (SHA256:d9bd350b04cd2540bbcbf9da1f3321f8c6bba1d8fe31de63d5afaf18a735744f) identified by 17/65 antiviruses on VT[2]. Let’s have a look at the infection path.

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It isn’t always defaults: Scans for 3CX usernames, (Mon, Nov 10th)

Today, I noticed scans using the username “FTP_3cx” showing up in our logs. 3CX is a well-known maker of business phone system software [1]. My first guess was that this was a default user for one of their systems. But Google came up empty for this particular string. The 3CX software does not appear to run an FTP server, but it offers a feature to back up configurations to an FTP server [2]. The example user used in the documentation is “3cxftpuser”, not “FTP_3cx”. Additionally, the documentation notes that the FTP server can run on a different system from the 3CX software. For a backup, it would not make much sense to have it all run on the same system.

Continue reading It isn’t always defaults: Scans for 3CX usernames, (Mon, Nov 10th)

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