The Coding-Agent Trap: When a “Free” LLM Endpoint Is the Adversary, (Mon, Aug 31st)

One of my internet-exposed inference honeypots was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names, and incorporated into infrastructure apparently used to provide “free” LLM backends. It then received a real coding-agent session &#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;&#;x26;#;x94; history, filesystem output, working paths, and the agent&#;x26;#;39;s local tool manifest. The honeypot did not request or cause any tool execution; what the request exposed is what a malicious operator in that position could do.

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The Coding-Agent Trap: When a “Free” LLM Endpoint Is the Adversary, (Mon, Aug 31st)

One of my internet-exposed inference honeypots was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names, and incorporated into infrastructure apparently used to provide “free” LLM backends. It then received a real coding-agent session &#;x26;#;xe2;&#;x26;#;x80;&#;x26;#;x94; history, filesystem output, working paths, and the agent&#;x26;#;39;s local tool manifest. The honeypot did not request or cause any tool execution; what the request exposed is what a malicious operator in that position could do.

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Some Malicious PE Stats, (Thu, Aug 27th)

During my last FOR610 session, a student asked me if I had some statistics in mind about the compilers used to generate malicious PE files? A couple of months ago, I shared some stats about the trend in 64bits VS. 32bits malware[1]. Can we go a bit further? I (vibe-)coded a Python script based on the pefile library[2] to extract some info from the PE headers. Indeed, the PE file format contains a lot of metadata! They can be accessed using a lot of tools, like Detect It Easy:

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Who Has Admin Rights in your Entra ID Directory?, (Wed, Aug 26th)

A common thing that folks should “worry” about in Entra (or any platform really) is “who has rights to administer”&#;x26;#;x3f;&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; Who can delete or change key things, or modify them in ways that might not be obvious (accidentally or on purpose).&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; Yes, we trust our people, but if they&#;x26;#;39;ve moved on to other roles or to other organizations, they change from “our people” to “used to be our people”.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;
Also, it&#;x26;#;39;s common to have too many admins.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; For instance, entry level support folks might need rights to change passwords, but they likely shouldn&#;x26;#;39;t have rights to change your intune policies or be global admins.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; The “too many admins” question is a common one that auditors will zero in on.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; This is #;4 on the CIS Critical Controls v7 as “Control of Admin Privileges”.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0; In version 8 of the list it&#;x26;#;39;s now at #;6 under “Access Control Management”&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;

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