“Reply-chain phishing” with a twist, (Tue, Jul 16th)

Few weeks ago, I was asked by a customer to take a look at a phishing message which contained a link that one of their employees clicked on. The concern was whether the linked-to site was only a generic credential stealing web page or something targeted/potentially more dangerous. Luckily, it was only a run-of-the-mill phishing kit login page, nevertheless, the e-mail message itself turned out to be somewhat more interesting, since although it didn’t look like anything special, it did make it to the recipient’s inbox, instead of the e-mail quarantine where it should have ended up.

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Protected OOXML Spreadsheets, (Mon, Jul 15th)

I was asked a question about the protection of an .xlsm spreadsheet. I&#;x26;#;39;ve written before on the protection of .xls spreadsheets, for example in diary entries “Unprotecting Malicious Documents For Inspection” and “16-bit Hash Collisions in .xls Spreadsheets“; and blog post “Quickpost: oledump.py plugin_biff.py: Remove Sheet Protection From Spreadsheets“.

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16-bit Hash Collisions in .xls Spreadsheets, (Sat, Jul 13th)

A couple years ago, in diary entry “Unprotecting Malicious Documents For Inspection” I explain how .xls spreadsheets are password protected (but not encrypted). And in follow-up diary entry “Maldocs: Protection Passwords“, I talk about an update to my oledump plugin plugin_biff.py to crack these passwords using password lists (by default, an embedded password list is used that is taken from the 2011 public-domain default password list used by John The Ripper).

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